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Abstract
Using an estimated dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model, I show that
shocks to a common international stochastic trend explain on average about 10% of
the variability of output in several small developed economies. These shocks explain
roughly twice as much of the volatility of consumption growth as the volatility of
output growth. Country-speci￿c disturbances account for the bulk of the volatility
in the data. Substantial heterogeneity in the estimated parameters and stochastic
processes translates into a rich array of impulse responses across countries.
1 Introduction
This paper tackles a perennial question in international economics: Is there a common
international business cycle? To address this question, I build a dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium (DSGE) model with country-speci￿c features and disturbances that are both
domestic and international. The model is estimated using Bayesian methods and data from
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1several small developed economies. The estimated model is then used to gauge the impact
that domestic and international shocks have on the countries in the sample and how the
structure of these economies a⁄ect the propagation of those disturbances.
Two observations motivate this paper. To begin with, one apparent lesson from the
so-called Great Recession is that some countries have been more vulnerable than others.
This asymmetry could not be better exempli￿ed by the diverging fortunes of two developed
small open economies (SOEs) such as Belgium and Spain. While the ￿rst country started
its recovery in the ￿rst quarter of 2010, the former one was still coping with the worst
of the recession. This empirical observation is, thus, a tale of heterogeneity: Structural
di⁄erences are responsible for heterogeneous business cycles across countries. Hence, the
inclusion of country-speci￿c components in our formulation can potentially reveal whether
distinct business cycles arise from country di⁄erentials in preferences, technology, shocks,
or all of them.
The second equally intriguing observation is that most countries (developed and devel-
oping) moved into the Great Recession with surprising synchronization. For example, by
the third quarter of 2009, 25 out of 30 OECD countries experienced negative growth for two
or more consecutive quarters.1 This synchronization tells us a story in which international
shocks bu⁄eting countries worldwide play a key role. Assessing the relative importance of
this common disturbance is a goal of this paper.
There is substantial empirical evidence suggesting the existence of a world factor that
drives international ￿ uctuations. Examples of this research agenda include, among others,
Kose et al. (2003), Stock and Watson (2005), and more recently Canova and Ciccarelli
(2009).2 All these manuscripts uncover the presence of a common (world) shock, although
its economic importance varies from study to study. The beauty behind these papers is that
they are based on ￿ exible reduced-form time-series formulations. This simplicity, however,
blurs the economic interpretation of the uncovered disturbances.
But providing a structural analysis of the country-speci￿c and common shocks is of
special importance from a policy point of view. If, for instance, the common international
disturbance explains a large proportion of the domestic ￿ uctuations and arises from, say,
technology changes, then e⁄orts to mitigate domestic market imperfections may be of
1According to the International Finance Statistics database, out of 58 countries for which there is GDP
information for 2009, 70% of them experienced a contraction for two or more consecutive periods.
2The estimation of world factors has also been addressed in important contributions by Stockman (1988),
Norrbin and Schlagenhauf (1996), Gregory et al. (1997), Clark and Shin (2000), and Koren and Tenreyro
(2007).
2limited scope or even result in ine¢ cient outcomes. In contrast, such policy e⁄orts may be
of some bene￿t if domestic volatility is mostly driven by country-speci￿c disturbances.
To study international business cycles, this paper proposes and estimates a tractable
open economy model rich enough to allow for country-speci￿c disturbances as well as com-
mon international factors for several countries around the world. The model incorporates
elements such as tradable and nontradable sectors, which help explain the dynamics of
real exchange rates found in the data. Methodologically, the paper shows how to express
the likelihood function of an open economy model with both common factors and several
idiosyncratic shocks. As will become clear, the proposed approach e⁄ectively blends ideas
from two strands of the literature: dynamic factor analysis (Stock and Watson, 1993) and
DSGE models (Christiano et al., 2005).
Tractability in the model hinges on three fundamental suppositions. To begin with, an
essential premise is that co-movement among countries is due to a common stochastic pro-
ductivity trend. Second, the estimation exercise considers seven developed economies, and
each of them is treated as an SOE.3 The advantage behind this assumption is that trade
￿ ows of a given country with the rest of the world are summarized by the country￿ s foreign
asset position. This e⁄ectively reduces the dimensionality of the model. Finally, based
on the empirical ￿ndings in Chang and Fernandez (2010) and Garcia-Cicco et al. (2010),
the country-speci￿c factors are identi￿ed as preference, interest rate, sectoral-speci￿c fac-
tor productivity, and terms-of-trade disturbances. Furthermore, the models for the seven
countries are jointly estimated using Bayesian methods.
An alternative to the proposed SOE framework would be to work with a multi-country
DSGE model. Such an approach would allow us to fully characterize the multiple inter-
actions among countries around the world. This speci￿cation, however, su⁄ers from the
curse of dimensionality, i.e., the size of the model grows with the number of countries. Es-
timating such a model with more than two countries is computationally challenging. It is
for this reason that reduced-form models have been widely favored to extract international
business cycles (Kose et al., 2008).
The substantive ￿ndings of this paper can be summarized as follows. First, the model
successfully accounts for the heterogeneous business cycles in the data, such as New
Zealand￿ s large ￿ uctuations, the excess volatility of consumption in Norway, or the volatile
patterns of real exchange rates. More interesting, this asymmetry in business cycles arises
3The countries in the sample are Australia, Belgium, Canada, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, and Sweden.
3from di⁄erences in the countries￿idiosyncratic disturbances as well as structural features,
such as habit formation. The diversity in the parameter estimates in turn translates into
a rich array of impulse responses across countries.
Second, the estimation exercise reveals the presence of a common stochastic produc-
tivity trend. Innovations to this trend are mildly persistent and explain about the same
fraction of the variability of the growth rates of output and investment. Interestingly,
those shocks explain roughly twice as much of the volatility of consumption growth as the
volatility of output growth. On average, innovations to the common trend account for
about 10% of the volatility of output growth in the sample. More pointedly, 16% of the
output growth volatility and 37% of the variability of the growth rate of consumption in
Australia are accounted for by the common trend. This estimated common factor closely
tracks the average growth rates of output and (in particular) of consumption in the SOEs.
Third, country-speci￿c preference and technology innovations account for a large frac-
tion of the volatility in the data. For instance, these disturbances together explain 68%
and 74% of the volatility of consumption in Spain and Sweden, respectively. A novel
feature of this paper is the analysis of the interaction between international prices and
common/country-speci￿c disturbances. Along this dimension, I ￿nd that more than 40%
of the dynamics of real exchange rates in all countries is captured by idiosyncratic term-
of-trade shocks. In contrast, common international disturbances have little impact on real
exchange rates. Finally, I ￿nd that all these results are present even after introducing a
country-speci￿c trend or an international demand shock.
A key contribution of this paper is to underscore the heterogeneity among countries and
how it a⁄ects the propagation of common shocks. In this sense, one could argue that (to
the extend that) the recent ￿nancial crisis was common to all countries but that its impact
is entirely speci￿c to each economy. To see this point, note that the posterior estimates
for cost of adjusting investment substantially vary across countries. Spain, for example,
displays an adjustment cost 14% larger than that present in Belgium. Furthermore, I ￿nd
that the former economy is more exposed to the international factor. Ultimately, these
real frictions induce inertia in the economy, which may help understand why the pace of
the recovery in Spain has been signi￿cantly faster than in Belgium.4
Because of its analysis of structural shocks on open economy models, this paper relates
4Nominal frictions most likely played a crucial role during the recent boom/bust cycle. This is because
nominal rigidities mean that prices do not fully adjust in response to shocks, which makes quantities more
responsive to shocks.
4to the business cycle literature in SOEs (Aguiar and Gopinath, 2007; and Fernandez-
Villaverde et al., 2011). The estimation of a structural model with temporal and cross-
section data shares some commonalities with the panel data estimation literature (Woodridge,
2002). This paper is also close in spirit to the contributions of Boivin and Giannoni (2006),
Canova et al. (2007), and Taylor (1993). Similar to Boivin and Giannoni￿ s research, this
paper estimates a DSGE model with multiple time series. The main di⁄erence is that
while my study is concerned with extracting a factor common to several countries, they
are interested in the e⁄ects of a large database on the estimation of closed economy DSGE
models. The analysis in this paper is close to Canova et al.￿ s Bayesian panel VAR analysis
in that we analyze international business cycles by decomposing them into common and
country-speci￿c shocks. Whereas I concentrate on the economic interpretation of these
innovations, Canova and coauthors study the stability across time of this decomposition.
Taylor (1993) estimates a reduced-form open economy model for the G7 countries. The
key discrepancies between our studies are: 1) his approach is nonstructural, and 2) unlike
my approach, he estimates the model on a country-by-country basis, which rules out a
common factor among the countries in his sample.5
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides some evidence
on the presence of a common component in several developed SOEs. Section 3 describes
the baseline model. The computation and estimation of the model are outlined in Sections
4 and 5. Finally, Sections 6 and 7 discuss the results and some extensions.
2 Trends and Cycles in Developed SOEs
To motivate the discussion to follow, the top panel in Figure 1 displays per-capita real
GDP in several developed economies (see Section 5 for details on the data). For comparison
purposes, the series are normalized to 0 in the ￿rst quarter of 1980 (the solid dark line
corresponds to the average of the series). A visual inspection of this ￿gure suggests that
recessions and expansions tend to equally a⁄ect SOEs. For example, the recession of the
early 1990s a⁄ected all countries, albeit in di⁄erent degrees. Whereas Canada and New
5My research also relates to the IMF￿ s Global Integrated Monetary and Fiscal project (GIMF; Kumhof
et al., 2010). Although our studies are structural, they di⁄er in two dimensions. First, the GIMF model
allows for direct trade linkages among several countries whereas in my study those linkages are indirect
through adjustments in the country￿ s foreign debt position. Second, contrary to my approach, the large
scale nature of the GIMF project makes an estimation exercise quite challanging. Hence, their model is
calibrated.
5Zealand were severely beaten by that crisis, Norway emerged almost unscathed from the
economic downturn. More important, SOEs seem to track each other over the years.
For instance, although Spain was growing above the countries average in the early 1990s
and Norway grew faster in the latter part of that decade, their output trends tend to
converge by the year 2010. Similarly, Sweden was growing below trend during most of the
1990s, but its output quickly recovered at the onset of the new century. Together, these
casual observations suggest that real GDP in developed SOEs may be co-integrated and
consequently share common components.6
The HP-￿ltered business cycles (bottom left panel in Figure 1) con￿rm that output in
the SOEs tends to closely co-move over the cycle. The ￿gure also reveals some interesting
di⁄erences across countries. For example, New Zealand, Norway, and Sweden are more
volatile than the other economies in the sample. Furthermore, output in Norway seems
countercyclical relative to the other countries in the last part of 1980s. The HP-￿ltered
series also make clear that the countries were severely a⁄ected by the recent economic
crisis. Indeed, all economies moved to a recession with surprising synchronization in 2009.
The ￿nal panel in Figure 1 portrays the quarterly growth rates of output found in
the data. The new plot reinforces our previous ￿nding of substantial co-movement among
countries over the past two decades. This synchronization suggests that developed SOEs
may share not only a stochastic trend but also a common factor that exclusively works at
the business cycle frequencies. In sum, the data reveal three important patterns, which will
play a fundamental role in shaping the rest of the paper. First, the developed economies
in the sample have exhibited similar trends over the past 30 years. Second, even at the
business cycle frequencies, real GDP shows correlation across countries. Finally, there is
heterogeneity among the SOEs studied in this paper.
3 Model
In the spirit of Gali (2008) and Gali and Monacelli (2005), I assume that there are N SOEs
indexed by j 2 [1;N]. Each of these countries is modeled ￿ la Mendoza (1995) and Corsetti
et al. (2008) with some modi￿cations to improve the empirical ￿tting. The SOE framework
is convenient because the countries￿interactions with the rest of the world are summarized
by the level of foreign indebtedness of each country. Such an assumption simpli￿es the
6More formally, Johansen￿ s (1991) maximal eigenvalue statistic con￿rms that the GDP series in Figure
1 are indeed co-integrated (for further details see Guerron-Quintana, 2010).
6solution of the model, since there is no need to account for the speci￿c interactions of
country j with, say, country j0. Crucially, it is assumed that all countries share a common
stochastic trend (this premise will be relaxed momentarily). There are, however, several
shocks that are country-speci￿c. These assumptions are intended to capture the salient
features reported in the previous section while making the solution and estimation of the
model feasible. In what follows, I will describe the government and the problems faced by
households and ￿rms in country j. For clarity, variables/parameters not indexed by j are
common to all SOEs.
3.1 Households
Each SOE is populated by a continuum of households. They choose on consumption
baskets of tradable goods (produced at home and abroad) and nontradable goods, labor,

















Note that the model displays external habit formation with parameter b and that intertem-
poral decisions are bu⁄eted by the country-speci￿c disturbance ￿j;t. The consumption bun-
dle, Cj, consists onnf a tradable bundle, Cj;T, and a nontradable good, Cj;N. The tradable



























Here, aH and aF are the weights on the consumption of the domestically and foreign pro-
duced goods, respectively (aF = 1￿aH). Similarly, aT and aN are the shares of the traded
bundle and the non-traded good in the consumption basket (aN = 1 ￿ aT). The presence
of nontradable goods follows the growing evidence that such an assumption improves the
model￿ s predictions regarding the dynamics of exchange rates and consumption (Engel and
Wang, 2011). Let PH, PF, and PN be the prices of the tradable good, the foreign good,
and the nontradable good, respectively (where there is no risk of confusion and to improve

























The household￿ s budget constraint is given by
PH;tCH;t + PF;tCF;t + PN;tCN;t + e PH;tIH;t +
PF;tBH;t+1
1 + rj;t
￿ Wtht + Rk;tKt + PF;tBH;t;
where BH;t+1 is a bond that promises one unit of the foreign tradable good tomorrow; Rk;t
is the return on capital; Wt is the wage rate in country j. As in Corsetti et al. (2008),
e PH;t is both the price of a unit of investment and the wholesale price of a unit of the home
made tradable good. The interest rate at which domestic residents borrow/save abroad is:



















The second expression on the right-hand side corresponds to the cost of adjusting the debt-
to-output ratio from its steady state value, b
[j]
H (this cost is needed to close the model; see
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, 2003). The price index pj;y is the steady-state relative price of
GDP, Yj;t (see below). For convenience, it is assumed that households take as given the cost
of borrowing from abroad, i.e., Bj;H;t+1 is beyond their in￿ uence. Furthermore, domestic
residents also face a premium, ￿j;t, when borrowing from foreign markets. Capital evolves
according to

















where gj is the steady-
state growth rate in country j. The functional form is based on Christiano et al.￿ s (2005)
￿nding that this speci￿cation is well suited to match the dynamics of investment.
3.2 Firms
Domestic ￿rms produce traded and nontraded goods. Tradable goods producers use capital


















8They take wholesale prices as given and maximize pro￿ts e PH;tYH;t ￿ WthH;t ￿ Rk;tKH;t.
These traded goods are sold in competitive world markets. Nontradable goods producers


















to to maximize pro￿ts e PN;tYN;t￿WthN;t￿Rk;tKN;t. Production at home is a⁄ected by the
stationary technology shocks AN;t and AH;t. In the baseline formulation, the nonstationary
productivity disturbance X
j
t also bu⁄ets domestic production. This disturbance has a
country-speci￿c trend, X
d;j
t , and a second trend shared with other countries, Xw
t . As a























1￿￿j. Moreover, it is
assumed that each country grows at the same rate in steady state: gj = g = gw, which
implies gd;j = g. Although this assumption is made for tractability reasons, it also captures
the notion that countries grow along the same balanced growth path in the long run.
Identi￿cation of the common and country-speci￿c trends can be grasped by a two-step
approach. In the ￿rst step, the common trend, Xw
t , is identi￿ed by the average behavior
of all variables in all countries in the sample. Intuitively, the weight, ￿[j], in equation (4)
is a measure of country j￿ s exposure to this international stochastic trend. Conditional
on this common factor, the idiosyncratic trend, X
d;j
t , captures departures in country j￿ s
growth path from the one dictated by international considerations. Note that the proposed
speci￿cation is rich enough to capture polar cases such as when the SOE j is exclusively
driven by domestic factors (￿[j] = 1) or when the common trend entirely dictates the growth
at country j (￿[j] = 0).
Following Burstein et al. (2006), there are distribution costs, which induce a wedge
between the retail price of tradable goods (PH and PF) and their wholesale price ( e PH and
e PF). It is assumed that delivering one unit of tradable goods to consumers demands ￿
units of the nontradable goods. If we assume that the distribution sector is populated by
competitive ￿rms, then the retail and wholesale prices are given by
PH = e PH + ￿[j]PN;t; and PF = e PF + ￿[j]PN;t:
9Because of the distribution sector, the law of price price holds at the wholesale level but
not at the consumer level.
The functional forms (2) and (3) capture the notion that technology progress at home
results from a combination of domestic and external components. Several elements support
the choice of such a production function. First and foremost, the productivity shock, Xt,
is a rather parsimonious way to account for the presence of a common stochastic trend
in SOEs as suggested by the empirical evidence in Section 2. Second, it follows an old
tradition in macroeconomics starting with Kydland and Prescott (1982), who take produc-
tivity shocks as the main source of ￿ uctuations in the economy. Furthermore, it is ￿ exible
enough to allow for short-run trend di⁄erentials, which in my formulation, arise from
country-speci￿c total factor productivity (TFP) shocks. Next, Glick and Rogo⁄ (1995) as-
sume that domestic productivity consists of a world component common to all economies
and a country-speci￿c term. Their world factor is estimated by ￿rst computing the Solow
residuals for the countries in their sample and then taking a GNP-weighted average. The
country-speci￿c shock is obtained as the di⁄erence between the world process and the coun-
try￿ s Solow residual. A ￿nal motivation comes from the evidence in Baxter and Crucini
(1995) and Rabanal et al. (2009). These authors report the presence of co-integrated sto-
chastic trends in several industrialized economies (the United States, European countries,
and Canada).
3.3 Stochastic Processes







logg + ￿g loggw
t￿1 + ￿g"g;t: (5)
For future reference, denote g[%] ￿ 100logg as the average growth rate in percentage


























H;t; log￿j;t = ￿[j]












N;t; log#j;t = ￿
[j]





10The shocks "￿;t are assumed to be independent normally distributed with mean 0 and
variance 1.
3.4 Equilibrium
As in Mendoza (1995), it is assumed that 1) the foreign (importable) good is the numeraire,
and 2) the relative price of the domestically produced traded good is exogenously deter-
mined in world markets. In particular, let e pH;t ￿ e PH;t=e PF;t follow an exogenous AR(1)










ph;t. These normalizations in turn imply that the
domestic household￿ s budget constraint is
pH;tCH;t + pF;tCF;t + pN;tCN;t + e pH;tIH;t +
BH;t+1
1 + rj;t
￿ wtht + rk;tKt + BH;t;
A lowercase price refers to the price of that good relative to the numeraire. For example, wt
and rk;t are the price of labor and capital in terms of the imported good. The presence of
distribution costs implies that the relative price of the foreign commodity at the retail level (
pF;t = PF;t=e PF;t) is di⁄erent from 1. With this convention, the real exchange rate in country











. Clearly, movements in the real exchange rate arise from
variations in the terms of trade (through its e⁄ect on the price of tradable goods), and
￿ uctuations in the markets for tradable goods produced at home and nontradable goods.
These ￿ uctuations may result from (country-speci￿c or common) productivity shocks or





N;t . This de￿nition captures the observation that the traded sector output in
developed economies accounts for about one-half of the total GDP.
An equilibrium is de￿ned in the standard way: Given a set of prices fpH;t;pF;t;pN;t;
e pH;t;rj;t;wt;rk;tg, the allocations fCH;t;CF;t;CN;t;IH;t;BH;t+1;ht;hH;t;hN;t;Kt;KH;t;KN;t;
YH;t;YN;tg maximize the household￿ s utility, maximize the ￿rms￿pro￿t problem, and satisfy
the economy￿ s resource constraints.










































e ￿t = ￿Et
￿
e ￿t+1rk;t+1 + (1 ￿ ￿)e ￿t+1
￿
; (7)





























Here, the multipliers associated with the household budget constraint and the capital
accumulation equation are e ￿t and e ￿t, respectively.
As we will see momentarily, the benchmark model is su¢ ciently rich to account for the
dynamics of the data. Indeed, adding other features such as a common demand shock or a
common transitory technology disturbance has little impact on the main predictions from
the benchmark model.
4 Likelihood with One Common Factor
This section shows how the likelihood of the model with one common factor can be evalu-
ated via the Kalman ￿lter. Let us start by noticing that the solution to the log-linearized
version of the stationary model for country j can be represented as
Sj;t = ￿[j]Sj;t￿1 + ￿[j]￿j;t;
Yj;t = ￿[j]Sj;t;
12where Sj;t = [S0
j;t;b gw
t ]0, Yj;t, and ￿j;t = [￿0
j;t;"g;t]0 denote the vectors of states, controls, and
structural shocks, respectively. Here, Sj;t = [b yj;t￿1;b cj;t￿1;b ij;H;t￿1; b pj;t;b kj;t;b bj;H;t;b e pj;H;t;b ￿j;t;
b ￿j;t;b aj;H;t;b aj;N;t;b gd










g;t]0. A lowercase variable corresponds
to a de-trended (stationary) variable, ct = Ct=Xt, while a hat indicates log-deviations from
the steady state. The matrices ￿, ￿, and ￿ depend on the structural parameters of each
country. The structure behind ￿j;t allows us to disentangle the ￿ uctuations in the SOE
j due to the common factor ￿ represented here by the shock "g;t ￿ from those due to
country-speci￿c conditions represented by the shocks "
j
￿;t .







and the expanded vector of structural shocks as ￿t = [￿0
1;t;￿0
2;t;￿￿￿;￿0
N;t;"g;t]0: Here, dim(St) =
[N ￿ Nc + N ￿ (Ns ￿ 1) + 1] and dim(￿t) = [(Nsh ￿ 1) ￿ N + 1], where N is the number









the state-space representation of the model with N countries is
St = F St￿1 + ￿￿t; (8)
YData
t = g[%] + H St:
With this formulation in hand, the Kalman ￿lter can be used to evaluate the likelihood
of the model. Since there are ￿ve observables per country (growth rates of output, con-
sumption, and investment, interest rates, and the growth rate of exchange rates) and four
country-speci￿c shocks, the state-space model does not require measurement errors (the
technical appendix shows the forms of the matrices F, H, and ￿).
The state-space representation (8) su⁄ers from the curse of dimensionality due to three
sources. The ￿rst source comes from the number of countries, N. Indeed, adding an extra
country requires Nc+Ns elements in the expanded state vector. Second, the complexity of
the DSGE model under study determines Nc, Ns, and Nsh. An additional state, control,






, grows with the number of countries and observables
to be explained. All these sources amount to increasing the dimensions of F, H, and ￿,
which is problematic since the Kalman ￿lter requires multiplying and inverting objects
that depend on those matrices. The larger those matrices are, the more expensive the
evaluation of the likelihood function is.
Assuming an SOE framework e⁄ectively controls the dimensionality problem by limiting
13Nc, Ns, and Nsh, i.e., containing the model￿ s complexity. However, such an assumption does
not preclude the ￿rst and third sources of dimensionality from happening. To control for
those sources, we restrict our study to explain output, consumption, investment, interest
rates, and exchange rates in seven developed SOEs. Even after these restrictions, the
expanded state vector, St, has a dimension of 120; an extra country increases the number
of states in St by 17, while an extra disturbance increasesfs its size by 7.
Let ￿j denote the set of all structural parameters in country j. Operationally, the
following steps are used to evaluate the likelihood of the system (8):
1. For country j, solve the DSGE model using ￿j as the relevant parameters.
2. Using the model￿ s solution, build the matrices ￿[j], ￿[j], ￿[j], and
P [j] as shown in
the technical appendix.
3. Repeat steps 1 and 2 for all countries in the sample.
4. Finally, compute the state representation (8) and build its likelihood, L, using the
Kalman ￿lter.
Although this section shows how to evaluate the likelihood function with only one
common factor, which corresponds to the stochastic trend in Section 6, it can be easily
extended to allow for multiple common factors (Section 7.3).
Before proceeding to the next sections, it is important to state some potential short-
comings associated with the proposed methodology. One concern regarding the model
arises from the lack of explicit trade ￿ ows of the SOEs with one another and with large
economies. This lack of terms-of-trade e⁄ects implies that all cross-dynamics are attributed
to the common shock. To the extent that spillovers are present in the data, the estimated
common shock is most likely upward biased. This is of some concern since our sample
includes Australia and Canada, which have strong trade links with Japan and the United
States, respectively, and European countries, which trade signi￿cantly with one another.
Technology is hardly the only driver of international business cycles. Other potential
disturbances include, for example, demand factors. In general, these misspeci￿cations may
result in biased parameters and processes. To shed light on these issues, Section 7 discusses
in some detail extensions to the benchmark model.
The approach proposed here has some shortcomings but so do reduced form methods.
Stock and Watson (2005) argue that there is no ￿ awless way to extract international com-
mon factors. For example, Kose et al.￿ s (2008) approach and the proposal presented in this
14paper share the feature that the common shock re￿ ects a mixture of purely international
common and country-speci￿c elements transmitted through trade (spillovers). Stock and
Watson￿ s (2002) principal component framework puts heavy weights on large countries,
resulting in estimating a common component when in fact there is none.
5 Estimation
This section describes the data as well as the econometric approach used to estimate the
multi-country model proposed in the previous sections. For each country in the sample, the
































￿g;￿g]. The lack of indexation in the last three parameters re￿ ects the assumption that
there is a common shock bu⁄eting all SOEs. The parameter b
[j]
H is set to match the ratio of
net exports to output observed in the data for each country. Without loss of generality, the
steady state of labor is normalized to 1. This assumption in turn pins down the value for
 [j]. r￿ is calibrated to match the average real interest rate in each country, which in turn
determines the value of the discount factor ￿. The remaining parameters in ￿
j
1 are set to
￿ = 0:32, ￿ = 0:025, and ’ = 0:001, which are standard choices in the literature (Schmitt-
Grohe and Uribe, 2003; Neumeyer and Perri, 2005). In total, there are 133 country-speci￿c
parameters (19 per country) plus three common parameters to be estimated.
The data, which are described in the appendix, cover the period 1980Q1 - 2010Q4. The
observables included in the sample are real interest rates, the quarterly growth rates of per-
capita real output, consumption, investment, and the growth rate of exchange rates for the
following developed economies: Australia, Belgium, Canada, New Zealand, Norway, Spain,
and Sweden. As argued in Section 2, the assortment of countries in the sample shares a
common stochastic trend. Furthermore, they are geographically located in di⁄erent conti-
nents and export di⁄erent goods. For example, Australia and Norway are big commodity
exporters, while Spain relies on tourism and ￿nancial services.7 Ultimately, one expects
that these countries to be bu⁄eted by shocks that are not necessarily correlated across
7Norway￿ s inclusion is of special interest because of its oil producer status. This feature implies that
Norway￿ s economic data can provide valuable information about oil shocks. To the extent that such shocks
a⁄ect economic activity (Hamilton, 2008), I consider that including Norway helps to better characterize
the dynamic properties of the common shocks bu⁄eting the countries in our sample. The alternative is to
directly use oil prices. This approach, however, requires modeling the oil sector in some detail, which adds
some unnecessary complexities to an already elaborated formulation.
15them. Altogether, these features should provide enough information to identify the inter-
national stochastic trend in the model, gw
t , as well as the country-speci￿c terms. Finally,
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and Sweden have been studied elsewhere (Lubik and
Schorfheide, 2007; Justiniano and Preston, 2008; Adolfoson et al., 2008) so their inclusion
facilitates comparison with the related literature.
Why don￿ t we include additional countries in the exercise? One reason is computational
costs. As argued above, adding a country increases the size of the state space by 15%. More
important, most of the remaining developed SOEs are located in Europe. Therefore, by in-
cluding them in the estimation we risk recovering a regional shock common to all countries
in the European area. The correlation of this disturbance with the remaining countries in
the sample is most likely weak, which may lead us to conclude (incorrectly) that the factor
is unimportant to, say, Canada and Australia. But this is problematic because we are inter-
ested in recovering a factor that is meaningful for countries in di⁄erent geographical areas.
Alternatively, we could incorporate emerging economies into the analysis. Yet Aguiar and
Gopinath (2007) forcefully argue that these economies display markedly di⁄erent business
cycles, which makes their inclusion unsuitable for our purposes.
Following the recent literature, e.g., Schorfheide (2000) and Smets and Wouters (2007),
the log-linearized version of the model is estimated using Bayesian methods. Let p(￿2)
denote the prior distribution on the parameters of interest and L the likelihood of the




, is proportional to p(￿2)L, where the likelihood function can be evaluated




using the random walk Metropolis-Hasting (MH) procedure (for details, see the excellent
survey by An and Schorfheide, 2007). The results are based on 400;000 draws from the
posterior simulator after an initial burn-in phase of 200;000 iterations. The acceptance rate
for the MH algorithm was set to approximately 0:23 as suggested by Casella and Roberts
(2004).
The priors imposed during estimation are reported in Table 1. The prior mean g[%]
is set to the average quarterly growth rate in percentage points across all countries and
observables in the sample. The priors for the persistence parameters re￿ ect the view
that the structural shocks display some autocorrelation. The relatively large standard
deviation helps to account simultaneously for processes with low and high persistence.
Following Justiniano and Preston (2008) and Garcia-Cicco et al. (2010), it is assumed that
there is some habit formation present in the data. Since there is little information about
16the adjustment cost of investment in open economies, I chose a very wide uniform prior.
Finally, the priors for the volatilities allow for a wide range of values with a 95 percentile
credible set given by [0:08;0:45].
6 Results
In this section, the implications of the common factor are explored using a variance de-
composition exercise and impulse responses.
6.1 A First Pass
Given the considerable attention that productivity has received in the recent SOE liter-
ature, Table 1 presents the posterior distributions for the country-speci￿c productivity
processes (upper panel) and the common productivity process, gw
t (bottom panel). For
completeness, the table also reports the estimates for some country-speci￿c parameters
such as habit formation, the cost of adjusting investment, and the parameters controlling
the elasticities of substitution in the consumption bundles. A ￿rst pass at the results re-
veals that the growth rate of the common factor displays some mild persistence and that
its volatility is bounded away from zero. This is an encouraging ￿nding because it suggests
that the factor is statistically relevant. The average growth rate median is 0:24%, which is
somewhat below the average quarterly growth rate across countries and observables in the
sample.
But does the common factor￿ s statistical signi￿cance translate into economic relevance?
To answer this question, Figure 2 displays the ￿ltered common factor, b gw
t , against several
time series (the posterior modes are used to compute the implied factor). The upper
left panel plots the factor (dotted line) and the unweighted average of the output growth
rates in the sample (solid line). To facilitate comparison, the variables are demeaned and
normalized so that their highest value is 1. Clearly, the factor does a good job tracking
the major movements in the average growth rate, e.g., the contraction in the early 1990s,
the boom in the middle and last part of the 1990s, or the small contraction in the early
2000s. Indeed, the correlation between b gw
t and the average growth rate is 0:77 (a strong
con￿rmation of the relationship between those two variables). Put di⁄erently, the model
indicates that the average growth in the data is in part driven by the common technology
disturbance.
17The second panel shows the common factor against the average consumption growth
rate. The co-movement is stronger than that of the average growth rate of output. The
correlation is even higher at 0:92, which suggests that the common trend plays a very
important role in accounting for the dynamics of average consumption in the sample. This
result is expected once we recall that consumption is highly responsive to trend shocks
(Aguiar and Gopinath, 2007). The dynamics of the common factor and the average growth
rate of investment are portrayed in the left lower panel. Although the factor tracks parts
of the dynamics of average investment, it also misses the persistent decline in the early
1990s and the slow rebound during the Great Recession. This last observation is not that
surprising once we recall that ￿nancial frictions were a main player in the recent crisis.
The ￿nal panel presents the common factor versus the average growth of exchange rates
in the sample. Direct observation indicates that the factor is substantially less correlated
with exchange rates (the correlation is 0:34). For example, the common element fails
to track the sustained depreciation during the ￿rst half of the 1980s. As will become
clear momentarily, shocks to the price of tradable goods account for a large fraction of
the variability of exchange rates, which explains the low correlation. In sum, this simple
exercise reveals that the model provides an adequate description of the data. Furthermore,
the estimation approach indeed recovers a component that is common to all countries and,
more important, this factor correlates well with economic activity.
On a closer inspection, Figure 2 indicates that the common factor also captures the
crisis/recovery of the last few years. At face value, this ￿nding suggests that the recent
global turmoil was triggered by a technology disturbance. This observation, however, needs
to be quali￿ed because most economic observers would agree that ￿nancial considerations
played an important role in the crisis. Hence, it is plausible that the role of the common
shock in recent years may be exacerbated by the lack of a fully-￿ edged ￿nancial sector
in the model. In my view, the key insight from Figure 2 is that a shock common to all
countries contributed to the recession in 2008 and 2009. Whether this disturbance was
driven by technology, ￿nancial frictions, or both is a matter for future research.8
To further illustrate my previous point, Figure 3 displays the growth rates in percentage
points for the actual variables (solid lines) and those implied by the common factor (dashed
lines).9 If we look at the output series, it is clear that most of the contraction in Canada,
8In principle, one could incorporate a ￿nancial sector a la Bernanke-Gertler in the model. However, the
model already has many interesting dimensions, so a ￿nancial block would clutter some valuable insight
revealed by the benchmark model.
9To obtain these paths, the model was simulated using the ￿ltered common shock as the only disturbance
18and Sweden may be attributed to the common technology disturbance. In contrast, the
shock overpredicts the recessions experienced by Australia and New Zealand. For these
countries, it must be the case that idiosyncratic disturbances dampened the impact of the
global shock. The investment series (last row) nicely exempli￿es that the same shock can be
asymmetrically ampli￿ed in each economy. For example, whereas the decline of investment
in Canada was predicted to be ￿7:2% at the trough of the recent recession, the estimated
contraction in Australia was ￿9:4%.
When we turn to the country-speci￿c productivities, two apparent patterns emerge from
Table 1: a) The tradable sector productivities are, on average, more volatile than those in
the nontradable sector; and b) the tradable productivities display substantial persistence.
As explained in the next sections, this large persistence and volatility implies that the
country-speci￿c productivities explain a large fraction of the variability of output in the
sample. Interestingly, the estimated productivities for the tradable sector are consistent
with previous studies. Aguiar and Gopinath (2007), for example, use a partial information
approach to estimate a production function similar to the one in the tradable sector. They
￿nd the persistence of productivity to be 0:97 for Canada. Justiniano and Preston (2008)
and Garcia-Cicco et al. (2010) report very persistent productivity processes for Canada
and Argentina, respectively. Similarly, Glick and Rogo⁄ (1995) ￿nd that productivity in
the G7 countries has a persistence close to one. (Section 6.3 provides intuition about why
our approach delivers such a persistent productivity process.)
The estimated parameters also indicate that habit formation and costly investment are
present in the countries, albeit to di⁄erent degrees. For example, while Norway has the
smallest adjustment cost of investment (0:21), the largest habit formation is present in
Belgium (0:50). Norway￿ s small cost is necessary to capture the large volatility present in
its real variables. Similarly, the large habit persistence in Belgium is required to predict
its smooth consumption pro￿le (more on this in the next sections). When we turn to
the other parameters in Table 1, we note that delivering one tradable good requires more
nontradable goods in Australia than in any other country (￿[j] = 1:35). If we recall that
Australia is a big country and far away from its trade partners, then one expects a large
distribution cost. In contrast, Belgium (a smaller country with close trade partners) has a
signi￿cantly smaller cost.
In terms of internationl exposure, ￿[j], I ￿nd that Spain is more vulnerable to shocks
bu⁄eting each country.
19to the common stochastic trend than Belgium. At face value, this ￿nding suggests that
shocks to that trend have a disproportionally larger impact on Spain, which is consistent
with the prolonged contraction experienced by the Spanish economy during the recent
crisis. Finally, there is small variation in the elasticities of substitution between home and
foreign-traded goods (1=1 ￿ %[j]) and between traded and nontraded goods (1=1 ￿ ￿[j]).
Nevertheless these estimated values are consistent with those reported in Corsetti et al.
(2008).
6.2 Common Shocks or Idiosyncratic Disturbances? Variance Decom-
position
The ￿rst panel in Table 2 presents the second moments predicted by the model as well as
those found in the data (numbers in square brackets).10 The ￿rst three rows correspond
to the standard deviation of output growth and the volatilities of the growth rates of
consumption and investment relative to that of output. The fourth and ￿fth rows display
the standard deviations of the real interest rate and the exchange rate, respectively. The
empirical moments display the usual patterns found in small developed economies: 1)
Output is more volatile than consumption but substantially less volatile than investment;
and 2) real exchange rates are more volatile than output. There are, however, other features
worth stressing. Output in New Zealand is more volatile than output in the other countries.
Additionally, in Norway, consumption is more volatile than output.
The theoretical moments reveal that the model replicates the salient features found in
the data. To begin, the model accounts to some extent for the variability of output in all
countries. Indeed, the model correctly ranks the countries in terms of their output ￿ uctu-
ations. While New Zealand is the more volatile economy, Belgium and Canada have the
lowest output volatility. Similarly, the model predicts the excessive volatility of investment
relative to output. The proposed model also accounts for the almost equal volatile series
of output and consumption in Canada. More important, it is capable of replicating the
excess variability of consumption found in Norway. But this is a remarkable feature of the
model given that it can simultaneously account for the less volatile pattern of consumption
in the remaining countries. Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) attribute the excessive consump-
tion volatility to the growth productivity shocks. Here, however, the stochastic trend is
10The results in this section, as well as the next sections, are based on the posterior modes of the
parameters.
20common to all countries so it cannot alone account for the large volatility of consumption
in only one country.
The combination of low habit formation and volatile preference shocks, ￿j;t, in Norway
induces the excess volatility.11 From the households￿￿rst order condition, more volatile
preference innovations distort the intertemporal substitution of consumption, inducing
households to consume more up-front or to defer consumption for the future. In either
case, the growth rate of consumption displays more volatility. In addition, if habit for-
mation is su¢ ciently low, consumption volatility can be larger than that of output. To
further illustrate this argument, I recomputed the second moments for Norway but set its
habit formation to 0:5 and its preference volatility, ￿#, to half its estimated value. Under
this counterfactual scenario, the volatility of output drops to 1:63 while the ratio ￿c=￿y is
now 0:76. Clearly, the model predicts a smoother pro￿le for consumption.
The second panel in Table 2 displays the fraction of the volatilities attributed to each
structural shock. For example, Australia￿ s productivity shock in the tradable sector, AH,
explains 35% and 83% of the variability of output and investment, respectively. The
row labeled gw reports the contribution of the common shock to the ￿ uctuations in the
model. For Canada, the common innovation accounts for 11%, 22%, and 12% of output,
consumption, and investment, respectively.
Rather than further discussing individual outcomes, I ￿nd it more illustrative to high-
light general patterns that result from the variance decomposition exercise. To begin with,
the common productivity shock, gt, contributes more to the ￿ uctuations of consumption
than to those of output and investment. (The e⁄ect on these last two variables is re-
markably small in New Zealand and Norway.) Since the common productivity shock is
permanent, households anticipate output to increase permanently in the future. This an-
ticipation generates a wealth e⁄ect that makes consumption contemporaneously rise by
more than the initial response of output (Garcia-Cicco et al., 2010). It is precisely this
initial spike in consumption that drives its large volatility following the common technology
disturbance. In addition, the long-lasting feature of the productivity shock implies that
the return to capital will be high in the future. Households feel no urgency to boost capital
today and, as a consequence, investment is not very volatile in response to the shock.
Interestingly, the degree of trade openness has no impact on how the common factor
11Neumeyer and Perri (2005), Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2009), and Garcia-Cicco et al. (2010) provide
a comprehensive discussion on the role of premium shocks in generating volatile consumption series in
emerging economies.
21in￿ uences a given economy. Belgium, a relatively open economy, is mildly a⁄ected by
shocks to the common trend. In contrast, the same trend shocks have a far larger impact on
Australia, which is comparatively less open to trade.12 Explaining this behavior is beyond
the scope of this paper, but one may venture that Australia￿ s dependence on commodities
makes it more sensitive to worldwide ￿ uctuations.
A second feature in Table 2 is that the common innovation is less important in those
economies that are relatively more volatile, namely, New Zealand and Norway. Moreover,
shocks to the common trend play a small role in accounting for the dynamics of output
and investment in those countries. Third, interest rates and exchange rates are barely
in￿ uenced by the common disturbance. Note, for example, that the shock explains only
2% of the movement in interest rates in Canada. Turning to the country-speci￿c trend,
gd;j, we note that is only relevant for New Zealand￿ s output, consumption, and investment.
Indeed, a back-of-the-envelope calculation reveals that this trend is required to generate
the excessive volatility found in New Zealand￿ s business cycles.
The numbers in Table 2 indicate that the productivity innovation in the tradable sec-
tor, A
j
H, is the only shock that explains a nontrivial fraction of the ￿ uctuations in the
observables. Furthermore, this shock accounts for a large fraction of the volatility of in-
vestment. This result is expected if one recalls that investment exclusively uses tradable
goods. When we turn to international prices, note that shocks to the wholesale price of
tradables, e pH;t, accounts for the sizeable share of the volatility of exchange rates. Indeed,
those shocks explain 40% and 86% of the real exchange rate ￿ uctuations in Norway and
Australia, respectively. Interestingly, this ￿nding echoes the empirical results in other pa-
pers such as Engel (1999).13 The tradable and nontradable technology disturbances also
contribute to the dynamics of exchanges rates but to a lesser degree than shocks to the
price of tradables. At face value, these ￿ndings suggest that supply-side innovations are
important drivers behind exchange rates (a result consistent with the claims in Corsetti
et al., 2008). Yet recall that e pH;t is exogenous, so it may well be that this shock captures
nonmodeled demand-side innovations at home and abroad.
In sum, we observe that all shocks play an important role, to some degree, in the
business cycles of the SOEs. Yet country-speci￿c disturbances explain a substantially
12During the period 1980￿2010, the trade openess indices for Australia and Belgium were 0:36 and 1:37,
respectively. The index is de￿ned as the ratio of exports plus imports to gross domestic product.
13Indeed, his decomposition exercise shows that more than 90% of the real exchange rate movement
between, for example, Canada and the U.S. can be accounted for by the relative price of traded goods.
22larger fraction of the countries￿volatilities than the common productivity shock does. This
pattern raises two relevant questions: 1) What accounts for the small explanatory power
of the common shock in the model? and 2) How do the results from my approach compare
with the related literature?
Intuitively, the small role of the common shock can be explained as follows. Figure 1
reveals that the data display co-movement but also substantial asymmetry at the business
cycle frequencies. Hence, if the model has a chance to match the data, it must allow the
country-speci￿c shocks to account for the bulk of the ￿ uctuations in the data. To this
end, the estimated high persistence of the (stationary) tradable productivity disturbance,
A
j
H, implies that its unconditional variance is substantially large. With the stationary
and nonstationary productivity disturbances ￿ghting to explain the variability of output
(they enter the model only via the production function), the large volatility of the former
shock leaves little room for the common trend shock to account for the ￿ uctuations found





assign more importance to the nonstationary productivity process, which would result in
two counterfactual predictions: 1) large co-movement across countries; and 2) excessive
volatility in consumption.
Interestingly, the importance of the trend shocks uncovered from my approach is consis-
tent with the results in Norrbin and Schlagenhauf (1996) and Aguiar and Gopinath (2007).
Using a dynamic factor model, the ￿rst authors report that 40% and 11% of the variance
of the forecast error in Canada can be attributed to country-speci￿c and international
(common) factors, respectively. Aguiar and Gopinath ￿nd that such trend shocks account
for a small fraction of the ￿ uctuations in developed economies.14
A more appropriate way to contrast my results with those in the literature is to take
one of those procedures and apply it to my sample. To that end, I follow Kose et al.￿ s
(2008) methodology. From all of the available procedures in the literature, their method
is the closest to mine in the sense that our approaches assign all cross-dynamics (country-
speci￿c disturbances spread through spillovers) to the common factor. In addition, we
rely on Bayesian methods, which make comparisons more transparent. In particular, Kose
et al.￿ s technique decomposes each observable i in the sample into common and country-






j;t + "i;t. Here, E"i;t"k;t = 0
for i 6= k, yi;t is the growth rate of either output, consumption, or investment; fwolrd is
14Using a di⁄erent approach, Koren and Tenreyro (2007) ￿nd that global sectoral shocks account for a
small fraction of industrial production volatility in Canada.
23a factor common to all countries and observables; f
country
j;t is a country-speci￿c factor; "i;t
is an observable-speci￿c disturbance, and the !i￿ s are the factor loadings. These loadings
capture the degree to which ￿ uctuations in yi;t can be accounted for by each factor.15
The contribution of each factor to the volatility of the observables is reported in the last
panel of Table 2. According to this decomposition, the world factor (fwolrd) explains, for
example, about 33%, 37%, and 15% of the volatility of Australia￿ s output, consumption,
and investment, respectively. By contrasting the results from Kose et al.￿ s method with
mine, we can argue that about half of that 33% explanatory power for Australian output
can be attributed to shocks to the stochastic trend.
For the remaining countries (except for Belgium and New Zealand), we see that labor-
augmenting, nonstationary technology shocks can account for at least one-fourth of Kose
et al.￿ s world factor. According to both methodologies, international disturbances explain
a relatively small fraction of the ￿ uctuations in Norway￿ s output. Kose et al.￿ s dynamic
factor analysis indicates that country and idiosyncratic shocks account for 85% of Nor-
wegian output. My approach interprets that fraction as being mostly driven by domestic
technology shocks and preference disturbances.
Broadly speaking, the approach proposed in this paper and Kose et al.￿ s methodology
nicely square in several dimensions. The two methods predict that the world shock ex-
plains a larger fraction of the volatility of consumption than the variability of investment.
Similarly, our techniques downplay the relevance of the international common factor to
explain the volatility of real interest rates and exchange rates. Indeed, these variables are
mostly driven by country-speci￿c innovations. Finally, according to the two decomposition
schemes, the common (international) factor accounts for a smaller fraction of the business
cycles of the most volatile countries, namely, New Zealand and Norway.
6.3 Common Shocks or Idiosyncratic Disturbances? Impulse Responses
To further clarify the importance of the common shock, this section reports the dynamic
paths from the estimated model after a positive shock to the structural disturbances. All
responses are expressed as percentage deviations from their trends (exchange rates are
plotted as percentage changes from steady state). Figure 4 presents the impulse responses
following a one-standard deviation shock to the common stochastic trend in the model
15For additional details on the estimation, such as priors and identi￿cation assumptions, the interested
reader can consult Kose et al. (2003 and 2008).
24("g;t). Because households anticipate the productivity shock to be permanent, they imme-
diately raise their consumption by more than the initial response of output. Furthermore,
households feel they will be wealthier in the future so leisure increases contemporaneously
at the expense of lowering labor. For example, while consumption is initially 0:75% above
its trend in Australia, its output level rises only 0:5%. In the long term, output, con-
sumption, and investment in that country increase by 1:25%, which is consistent with the





Figure 4 also reveals that there is substantial heterogeneity in the countries￿responses
even though the estimated stochastic process (equation 5) is the same for all the economies.
This observation is accounted for by the di⁄erent estimates of habit formation, the cost
of adjustment in investment, and the weight of the common trend, ￿j, reported in Table
1. It is precisely di⁄erent weights in the trend functions (equation 4) that account for the
di⁄erent long-term impact of the common productivity shock. More to the point, recall
from the previous section that the parameters d[j] and {[j] are calibrated to match relevant
data in each country. This asymmetry in some of the structural parameters necessarily
changes the propagation mechanism of the trend shocks inside each country, which in turn
explains the heterogeneous impulse responses. For example, the large initial response of
investment in Norway is likely a consequence of the fairly low estimate for its adjustment
cost function.
For completeness, Figure 5 presents the dynamic e⁄ects of the other shocks in the model.
Output is more reactive than consumption to the stationary tradable and nontradable
technology innovations. As explained above, the temporary nature of the shocks is behind
this ￿nding. Interestingly, tradable productivity induces a highly persistent response in all
variables, in particular consumption. This persistence results from the large estimates for
￿
[j]
h recovered by the econometric approach. When we turn to the domestic trend shock,
we note that it has a disproportionately larger impact on New Zealand, which is necessary
to explain its more volatile business cycles.
Consistent with the results in Table 2, real exchange rates are driven by shocks to
the terms of trade and innovations to the tradable and nontradable productivities. More
important, while a tradable productivity shock appreciates the real exchange rates in all
countries, a nontradable productivity innovation has the opposite e⁄ect.16 Since the terms
of trade are exogenous, the appreciation following the tradable-sector productivity improve-
16The appreciation following the productivity improvement in the tradable sector is consistent with the
empirical evidence reported in Corsetti et al. (2010).
25ment entirely arises due to the Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson e⁄ect. Finally, the responses to
the premium and preference innovations are standard. For brevity, they are not discussed
here, but the interested reader can consult the working paper version (Guerron-Quintana,
2010).
7 Extensions
A clear message from Section 2 is that even after removing trends in the data, the SOEs tend
to closely co-move over the cycle (see the HP-￿ltered series in Figure 1). This observation
suggests that the countries may be also sharing a stationary shock. For example, one can
easily think of a common demand shock resulting from a worldwide decline in con￿dence.
To explore this possibility, I introduce an additional common (and stationary) disturbance
either in the production sector or in the demand side of the model.17
The second moments in Table 1 indicate that Norway and New Zealand are substantially
more volatile than the other economies. Hence, the second extension assesses the impact
that the absence of those countries have on the estimated common factor. There is a
concrete message from these alternative scenarios: Although common factors can account
for up to one-third of the business cycles in the developed SOEs, a large part of their
￿ uctuations is captured by domestically brewed elements.18
7.1 Common Stationary Productivity







































for the tradable and nontradable sectors, respectively. Note that the SOEs now share a
common trend, X, as well as a stationary innovation, Aw. Moreover, let log(Aw
t ) follow an
17Adding an additional common disturbance is consistent with Stock and Watson￿ s (2005) ￿nding that
FAVARs favor a formulation with two rather than one common international shock.
18There are other potential robustness checks we could easily think of, such as the inclusion of US data
to discipline the common international factor or interest shocks that are common to all countries. The
interested reader can consult Guerron-Quintana (2010).
26AR(1) process whose persistence and volatility are given by ￿A;w and ￿A;w, respectively.
Table 3 shows the variance decomposition under the new speci￿cation.19 Since the station-
ary common shock enters the economy solely through the production functions, it is hardly
surprising that the new shock mostly contributes to the volatility of output. Together the
two international factors (gw and Aw) explain about 25% and 31% of the ￿ uctuations of
output in Australia and Canada, respectively. Two-thirds of the world shock recovered from
the Kose et al.￿ s approach corresponds to what my method identi￿es as technology-related
disturbances. More important, in accordance with the benchmark model, country-speci￿c
innovations explain a big chunk of the business cycles (at least 70%). Furthermore, the
common factors continue to play a relatively small role in accounting for the volatility of
Norway and New Zealand.
7.2 Common Demand Innovation
Suppose that the preference shock is composed of a country-speci￿c part, ￿j;t as in the
benchmark model, and a common preference disturbance, ￿w



















As with the other shocks, log(￿w
t ) is assumed to follow an AR(1) process with persistence
and volatility parameters given by ￿￿;w and ￿￿;w, respectively. The idea behind this new
speci￿cation is to factor in a common demand shock such as a global decline in con￿dence
or worldwide limited access to consumer credit. Ultimately, these events should manifest
themselves as a contraction in demand at home.
Table 4 reveals that the common demand shock accounts for a limited fraction of the
business cycles.20 As one may expect, the shock is relevant for output and consumption
but not for investment. Overall, the main conclusions from the benchmark model remain
almost intact. The only noticeable di⁄erence is that country-speci￿c disturbances are more
important now for Spain than in the baseline formulation. From a variance decomposition
perspective, the model with two common technology innovations seems to be the more
19The mode of the estimated parameters governing the common factors are ￿g = 0:22 and ￿g = 1:36 for
the trend process and ￿A;w = 0:93 and ￿A;w = 0:41.
20The mode of the estimated parameters governing the common factors are ￿g = 0:14 and ￿g = 2:18 for
the trend process and ￿￿;w = 0:94 and ￿￿;w = 0:38 for the preference disturbance.
27relevant speci￿cation toward understanding the business cycles in the developed SOEs.
7.3 Five Countries
Business cycles in New Zealand and Norway are clearly more volatile than in the other
countries in the sample (see Figure 1 and Table 2). This observation suggests that the
presence of those countries may dampen the role of the common factor while raising the
relevance of country-speci￿c shocks. To explore this possibility, I re-estimate the bench-
mark model but exclude New Zealand and Norway from the estimation. Two clear pictures
emerge from the new exercise (Table 5). For Belgium, Canada, and Sweden, the interna-
tional trend explains a fraction of their ￿ uctuations that are slightly larger than in the
baseline model. The ￿rst observation accords our intuition that the common trend shock
should become more important once we remove the more volatile economies.
In contrast, the common factor accounts for a smaller fraction of their business cycles
than in the benchmark speci￿cation for Australia and Spain. Since New Zealand is a
major trade partner of Australia, the reduced in￿ uence of the trend shock on this economy
indicates that trade ￿ ows between these countries are partially captured in the model
through the common factor.
8 Concluding Remarks
This paper uncovers the presence of common factors driving ￿ uctuations in developed
SOEs. A novelty in the paper is that these factors are recovered using a DSGE model and
Bayesian methods. When the data are expressed in growth rates, the common factor is
identi￿ed as a stochastic trend in the production function. Shocks to this trend explain on
average 10% of the volatility of the growth rates of output and investment, respectively.
Interestingly, those shocks explain roughly twice as much of the volatility of consumption
growth as the volatility of output growth. In contrast, the common factor plays a small
role in describing the dynamics of exchange rates or interest rates. TFP, preference, and
terms-of-trade shocks explain the bulk of the volatility of output, consumption, investment,
interest rates, and exchange rates.
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1.1 Likelihood with One Common Factor
This section shows the structure of the matrices required for the state-space representation (Section 4). A 0 de-
notes a conformable matrix of zeros. Let












































































s , and ￿
[j]
g have dimensions (Ns ￿ 1) ￿ (Ns ￿ 1), (Ns ￿ 1) ￿ 1, 1 ￿
(Ns ￿ 1), 1￿1, Nc ￿(Ns ￿ 1), and Nc ￿1, respectively. Then for the case of two countries, the matrices F and

















































































































g ￿g. The element ￿g has not been indexed because it is
common for both countries. H is a matrix of ones and zeros that selects the appropriate elements of St needed
to build the model￿ s equivalent to the observables found in the data. This analysis can be easily extended when
two or more countries are in the data.1.2 Data
Data are collected from the OECD. The sample runs from 1980Q1 to 2010Q4.
￿ Real E⁄ective Exchange Rates come from the Financial Indicators database and are based on relative
consumer price indices with base period 2005. Details on the methodology are given in M. Durand, J.
simon and C. Webb (1992), "OECD￿ s Indicators of International Trade and Competitiveness," OECD
Economics Department Working Papers, No. 119.
￿ GDP corresponds to the gross domestic product (expenditure approach) series in the Quarterly National
Account database.
￿ Investment corresponds to the gross ￿xed capital formation series in the Quarterly National Account
database.
￿ Consumption corresponds to the private ￿nal consumption expenditure series in the Quarterly National
Account database.
￿ Real Interest Rates are obtained as the di⁄erence between the short-term interest rate (Financial
Indicators database) and expected in￿ ation. Expected in￿ ation at time t is calculated as the average
in￿ ation over the past four quarters, where in￿ ation is computed using consumer price indices from the
Consumer Price database. Real interest rates are expressed in annualized percentage points.
GDP, investment, and consumption were expressed in per-capita terms by dividing them by the population








































































































































































































For the Gamma, G, and Beta, B, distributions, the values in parenthesis are the mean and standard deviation. For the inverse gamma, IG, the values
are the share and scale parameters. For the uniform distribution, U, the values are the lower and upper bounds.
The 95 percentile probability interval is in square brackets.Table 2: Second Moments
Australia Belgium Canada New Zeland
y 1:49 [1:03] 1:11 [0:78] 1:11 [0:87] 2:23 [1:95]
c=y 0:84 [0:95] 0:74 [0:72] 0:99 [0:97] 0:81 [0:80]
i=y 3:82 [2:93] 3:46 [3:04] 3:36 [2:85] 4:21 [2:60]
R 4:09 [2:58] 2:90 [2:64] 4:01 [2:47] 6:22 [2:79]
p 4:64 [4:38] 1:38 [1:38] 2:72 [2:51] 5:17 [3:84]
Variance Decomposition
y c i R p y c i R p y c i R p y c i R p
gw 0:16 0:37 0:16 0:03 0:00 0:06 0:11 0:08 0:02 0:00 0:11 0:22 0:12 0:02 0:00 0:03 0:09 0:05 0:00 0:00
gd 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:02 0:02 0:01 0:00 0:00 0:01 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:05 0:14 0:07 0:01 0:00
AH 0:35 0:17 0:83 0:38 0:09 0:21 0:07 0:51 0:41 0:22 0:29 0:17 0:28 0:28 0:14 0:36 0:11 0:85 0:30 0:11
AN 0:35 0:33 0:00 0:00 0:04 0:34 0:30 0:00 0:00 0:32 0:45 0:47 0:00 0:00 0:11 0:36 0:41 0:00 0:00 0:08
e pH 0:01 0:00 0:00 0:47 0:86 0:16 0:18 0:36 0:12 0:45 0:01 0:00 0:46 0:46 0:75 0:05 0:06 0:02 0:62 0:80
 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:03 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:01 0:09 0:00 0:02 0:02 0:10 0:10 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:02 0:00
 0:13 0:11 0:00 0:08 0:00 0:20 0:31 0:02 0:34 0:00 0:11 0:11 0:13 0:13 0:00 0:14 0:19 0:01 0:04 0:00
Variance Decomposition Reduced Form
World 0:33 0:37 0:15 0:00 0:02 0:36 0:22 0:06 0:00 0:00 0:42 0:40 0:34 0:01 0:07 0:19 0:21 0:11 0:00 0:04
Country 0:25 0:08 0:33 0:03 0:02 0:19 0:18 0:09 0:03 0:07 0:17 0:13 0:06 0:03 0:06 0:41 0:33 0:19 0:01 0:06
Idiosyn 0:42 0:55 0:52 0:97 0:96 0:45 0:60 0:85 0:97 0:93 0:41 0:47 0:60 0:96 0:85 0:40 0:46 0:70 0:99 0:89Table 2 (Continued): Second Moments
Norway Spain Sweden
y 1:84 [1:35] 1:16 [0:88] 1:45 [1:25]
c=y 1:12 [1:06] 0:78 [0:96] 0:99 [0:91]
i=y 5:99 [4:57] 3:44 [2:76] 3:15 [2:23]
R 4:24 [2:70] 4:25 [3:47] 6:28 [2:58]
p 2:16 [2:04] 2:45 [1:94] 3:32 [2:86]
Variance Decomposition
y c i R p y c i R p y c i R p
gw 0:06 0:11 0:07 0:01 0:00 0:14 0:26 0:15 0:03 0:00 0:08 0:17 0:11 0:01 0:00
gd 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:01 0:01 0:01 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:01 0:01 0:00 0:00
AH 0:20 0:04 0:39 0:39 0:23 0:33 0:15 0:82 0:29 0:15 0:29 0:10 0:80 0:24 0:12
AN 0:29 0:28 0:00 0:00 0:36 0:35 0:35 0:00 0:00 0:10 0:34 0:37 0:00 0:00 0:11
e pH 0:18 0:17 0:49 0:05 0:40 0:03 0:03 0:01 0:50 0:75 0:07 0:06 0:06 0:65 0:77
 0:01 0:01 0:00 0:11 0:00 0:01 0:01 0:01 0:06 0:00 0:01 0:01 0:01 0:05 0:00
 0:27 0:39 0:04 0:45 0:00 0:14 0:18 0:01 0:12 0:00 0:21 0:27 0:01 0:04 0:00
Variance Decomposition Reduced Form
World 0:13 0:10 0:03 0:04 0:01 0:30 0:37 0:21 0:00 0:02 0:36 0:25 0:28 0:00 0:09
Country 0:04 0:07 0:02 0:08 0:06 0:33 0:21 0:37 0:01 0:02 0:08 0:08 0:06 0:10 0:11
Idiosyn 0:81 0:83 0:95 0:88 0:93 0:36 0:41 0:41 0:99 0:96 0:55 0:66 0:66 0:90 0:80Table 3: Second Moments - Common Stationary Productivity
Australia Belgium Canada New Zeland
y c i R p y c i R p y c i R p y c i R p
gw 0:05 0:19 0:06 0:02 0:00 0:02 0:05 0:04 0:00 0:00 0:03 0:11 0:05 0:01 0:00 0:00 0:02 0:01 0:00 0:00
Aw 0:20 0:03 0:02 0:02 0:00 0:25 0:04 0:10 0:04 0:00 0:28 0:04 0:05 0:03 0:00 0:08 0:01 0:02 0:01 0:00
gd 0:00 0:01 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:09 0:28 0:09 0:04 0:00 0:01 0:02 0:01 0:00 0:00 0:04 0:13 0:06 0:01 0:00
AH 0:36 0:21 0:91 0:50 0:10 0:28 0:01 0:65 0:28 0:11 0:26 0:19 0:88 0:40 0:14 0:36 0:13 0:90 0:32 0:11
AN 0:28 0:45 0:00 0:00 0:04 0:33 0:56 0:00 0:00 0:18 0:33 0:54 0:00 0:00 0:09 0:34 0:48 0:00 0:00 0:08
e pH 0:01 0:00 0:00 0:41 0:87 0:01 0:02 0:02 0:53 0:71 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:42 0:77 0:05 0:05 0:01 0:62 0:81
 0:01 0:00 0:00 0:04 0:00 0:01 0:02 0:01 0:10 0:00 0:01 0:02 0:01 0:10 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:02 0:00
 0:10 0:10 0:00 0:02 0:00 0:01 0:01 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:06 0:08 0:00 0:03 0:00 0:13 0:19 0:00 0:02 0:00
Norway Spain Sweden
y c i R p y c i R p y c i R p
gw 0:04 0:09 0:06 0:01 0:00 0:04 0:05 0:07 0:01 0:00 0:05 0:07 0:12 0:01 0:00
Aw 0:08 0:01 0:02 0:02 0:00 0:18 0:01 0:06 0:02 0:00 0:12 0:01 0:05 0:01 0:00
gd 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:29 0:49 0:79 0:10 0:00 0:24 0:43 0:71 0:04 0:00
AH 0:19 0:05 0:40 0:39 0:24 0:01 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:01 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00
AN 0:27 0:28 0:00 0:00 0:37 0:29 0:19 0:00 0:00 0:16 0:37 0:24 0:00 0:00 0:15
e pH 0:17 0:17 0:47 0:04 0:39 0:02 0:02 0:02 0:36 0:84 0:02 0:01 0:03 0:49 0:85
 0:01 0:01 0:00 0:11 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:01 0:04 0:00 0:01 0:01 0:01 0:05 0:00
 0:25 0:40 0:04 0:43 0:00 0:18 0:24 0:06 0:48 0:00 0:19 0:23 0:08 0:41 0:00Table 4: Second Moments - Common Demand
Australia Belgium Canada New Zeland
y c i R p y c i R p y c i R p y c i R p
gw 0:18 0:39 0:15 0:04 0:00 0:03 0:07 0:05 0:01 0:00 0:11 0:22 0:11 0:02 0:00 0:05 0:13 0:07 0:01 0:00
w 0:02 0:02 0:00 0:01 0:00 0:02 0:04 0:00 0:03 0:00 0:03 0:02 0:00 0:02 0:00 0:01 0:01 0:00 0:00 0:00
gd 0:01 0:01 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:13 0:24 0:17 0:05 0:00 0:01 0:01 0:01 0:00 0:00 0:06 0:15 0:08 0:01 0:00
AH 0:36 0:17 0:84 0:42 0:10 0:32 0:02 0:73 0:29 0:11 0:30 0:17 0:86 0:31 0:15 0:34 0:10 0:83 0:30 0:11
AN 0:32 0:31 0:00 0:00 0:04 0:45 0:57 0:00 0:00 0:19 0:44 0:47 0:00 0:00 0:11 0:35 0:39 0:00 0:00 0:08
e pH 0:01 0:00 0:00 0:45 0:86 0:02 0:03 0:02 0:55 0:70 0:01 0:00 0:00 0:47 0:74 0:05 0:05 0:02 0:63 0:81
 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:03 0:00 0:01 0:01 0:02 0:09 0:00 0:02 0:02 0:01 0:10 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:02 0:00
j 0:11 0:09 0:00 0:06 0:00 0:01 0:02 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:09 0:09 0:01 0:08 0:00 0:14 0:18 0:00 0:03 0:00
Norway Spain Sweden
y c i R p y c i R p y c i R p
gw 0:06 0:10 0:07 0:01 0:00 0:07 0:06 0:10 0:01 0:00 0:09 0:09 0:15 0:01 0:00
w 0:00 0:01 0:00 0:01 0:00 0:01 0:01 0:00 0:01 0:00 0:01 0:01 0:00 0:01 0:00
gd 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:34 0:49 0:82 0:10 0:00 0:26 0:43 0:72 0:04 0:00
AH 0:20 0:04 0:40 0:39 0:24 0:01 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:01 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00
AN 0:28 0:28 0:00 0:00 0:36 0:36 0:20 0:00 0:00 0:17 0:40 0:23 0:00 0:00 0:16
e pH 0:18 0:17 0:48 0:05 0:40 0:02 0:02 0:02 0:39 0:83 0:02 0:02 0:04 0:54 0:84
 0:01 0:01 0:00 0:11 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:01 0:04 0:00 0:01 0:01 0:01 0:05 0:00
j 0:26 0:39 0:04 0:44 0:00 0:18 0:21 0:05 0:43 0:00 0:20 0:21 0:07 0:35 0:00Table 5: Variance Decomposition - Five Countries
Australia Belgium Canada
y c i R p y c i R p y c i R p
gw 0:09 0:25 0:11 0:02 0:00 0:06 0:10 0:07 0:01 0:00 0:13 0:29 0:24 0:02 0:00
gd 0:14 0:13 0:02 0:28 0:00 0:01 0:02 0:01 0:00 0:00 0:14 0:14 0:02 0:32 0:00
AH 0:38 0:14 0:87 0:34 0:08 0:21 0:07 0:51 0:40 0:21 0:25 0:04 0:70 0:16 0:08
AN 0:37 0:47 0:00 0:00 0:05 0:36 0:32 0:00 0:00 0:33 0:43 0:47 0:00 0:00 0:13
e pH 0:01 0:00 0:00 0:34 0:87 0:16 0:18 0:37 0:12 0:45 0:03 0:03 0:02 0:44 0:79
 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:03 0:00 0:00 0:01 0:01 0:09 0:00 0:01 0:02 0:01 0:06 0:00
 0:01 0:01 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:20 0:31 0:03 0:37 0:00 0:00 0:01 0:00 0:00 0:00
Spain Sweden
y c i R p y c i R p
gw 0:06 0:06 0:10 0:01 0:00 0:08 0:10 0:17 0:01 0:00
gd 0:34 0:48 0:81 0:09 0:00 0:25 0:40 0:70 0:04 0:00
AH 0:01 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:01 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00
AN 0:37 0:21 0:00 0:00 0:18 0:42 0:24 0:00 0:00 0:16
e pH 0:02 0:02 0:02 0:36 0:82 0:02 0:02 0:05 0:55 0:84
 0:00 0:00 0:01 0:04 0:00 0:01 0:01 0:01 0:05 0:00





































Figure 2: Filtered Common Factor
























































































































































































































Figure 4: Common Trend Shock



































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 5 (Continued): IRFs Country-Specific Innovations